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MONETARY POLICY AND THE TERM
STRUCTURE OF INTEREST RATES
ABSTRACT
This paper addresses a prominent empirical failure of the expectations theory of thetemi
smicture of interest rates under the assumption of rational expectations. This failure concerns
tL magnitude of slope coefficients in regressions of short rate (or long-rate)changes on long-
short spreads. It is shown that the anomalous empirical findings can be rationalized withthe
expectations theory by recognition of an exogenous random (but possibly autoregressive) term
premium plus the assumption that monetary policy involves smoothing of an interest rate
instrument --theshort rate --togetherwith the responses to the prevailing level of the spread.
Bennett T. McCallum




In a recent paper. McCallum (1994) argues that a prominent empirical
puzzle involving exchange rate behavior——namely, the drastic apparent failure
of uncovered interest parity-—can be rationalized as aconsequence of
systematic monetary policy behavior that has been ignored in most previous
Studies. Here it will be argued that a similar result is applicable in the
context of an apparent failure of the expectations theory of the term
structure of interest rates.In particular, the failure of short—rate (and
long—rate) changes to be related as predicted to prevailing long-short
spreads is shown to be a plausible consequence of monetary policy behavior
that features interest rate smoothing in combination with policy responses to
movements in the long-short spread.2 This explanation is entirely consistent
with, but more general and more fully developed than, the one proposed in a
notable study by Mankiw and Miron (l986).
The paper's organization is as follows. In Section II,the
term—structure puzzle is reviewed and the paper's rationalization is
developed for the simplest two—period case. Then in Section III, the
analysis is extended to long rates of greater maturity.Additional evidence
is developed in Section IV and concluding remarks appear in Section V.
II. Two—Period Case
In this sectionwe consider the issue and our proposed explanation for
the two-period case, i.e., for the relationship between yields on one—period
and two—period bonds, denoted rt and R respectively. Assumingthat the
securitiesin question are discountbonds,the expectations theory of the
termstructure positsthat the "long' rate R is related to rt and the
expectedfuture short rate Er.1asfollows:4
(1)R =O.5(r+Er,1)+
Here =E(rIc1)with ={rt,rt,, R, R_1. .. . }so we areassuming rational expectations.The term Et Is a "term premium' that is
often assumed constant. Defining the expectational error Ct,irt,-
Er+1,equation (1) implies
(2) 1/2 (rt — (R—rt)—+ 1/2
Then if is assumed constant, ,theorthogonality of with R and
rt implies that the slope coefficientin a regression of the form
(3) 1/2 (rt —rti) +(R-1—rt)+disturbance,
should have a probability limit of 1.0.An estimated value significantly
different from 1.0 Is Inconsistent either with the expectations theory or one
of the maintained hypotheses.
In fact,It has been documented by many researchers that slope
coefficients tend to be well below 1.0 in post-1914 data for the United
States, often significantly so in terms of estimated standard errors.Point
estimates obtained in a number of studies are reported in Table 1.There we
see that the slope coefficient values are all well below i.0, with the
exception of Mankiw and Hiron's value for 1890—1914 and Campbell and
Shiller's final value.5 The former, which pertains to observations taken
before the founding of the Federal Reserve, will be discussed In Section IV.
The latter is accompanied by a rather large standard error and pertains to an
exceedingly long short rate.6
One possible explanation for these findings Is, of course, that the
expectations theory is simply untrue——but the quantitative extent of the
discrepancy seems surprisingly large.Another possibility is invalidity of
the rational expectations (RE) hypothesis,7 but it seems unlikely that the
same general type of systematic expectational error would prevail over
different sample periods.In any event, our proposed explanation is that
is not constant-—i.e., that there is a variable term premium—-and that
monetary policy is conducted In a manner to be explained momentarily.The
2Table 1
Empirical Results. Two—Period Case
Study Sample Period Short Rate Slope Coefficient
Hankiw & Mlron (1986) 1959 —1979 3 no. 0.23
1951 —1958 —0.33
1934 —1951 —0.25
1915 —1933 0 42
1890 —1914 0.76
Evans & Lewis (1994) 1964 —1988 1 no. 0.42
Campbell & Shlller (1991) 1952 —1987 1 no. 0.50






Fama (1984) 1959 —1982 1 no. 0.46
Roberds, Runkle 1984 -1991 3 no. —0.01
& Jhiteman (1993)
1979 —1982 3 no. 0. 19
1975 -1979 3 no. 0.43
3process generating is assumed to be covarlance stationary but not
necessarily white noise. For specificity, the process will be taken to be
autoregressive of order one (AR (1)1:
(4)t Pet-i +Ut
Here ut is white noise and IpI<l.0. To this writer it seems implausible that
there would not be period—to—period variability In the discrepancy term
in (1), a term that reflects changes in tastes regarding the need fox-
financial flexibility and a myriad of other disturbing influences, none major
enough to justify separate recognition. In any event, It is not the case
that the inclusion of a random disturbance in Ci)convertsthe
expectations theory into a tautology. That would be the case if were
related to rt. and R as in (1) without restriction. But Instead the
present asswnptlon is that is exogenous with respect to rt and R. This
reflects the idea that the expected one—period holding yields on one—period
and two-period bonds are equal up to a constant plus a random disturbance
term; that these yields differ from that constant only randomly. This is,
for the case at hand, the essence of the expectations theory.
Regarding monetary policy, our hypothesis begins with the observation
that actual policy behavior in the U.S. (and many other nations) involves
manipulation of a short—term interest rate "instrument" or "operating
variable." Specifically, we assume that8
(5)r ort_ +A(R
—rt)+
whereo a 0 is presumed to be close to 1.0 and X m 0 to be smaller than 2.
Thus there Is a considerable element of Interest rate "smoothing" —-keeping
rt close to rt_i ——andalso a tendency to tighten policy (by raisingr)
wheneverthe Spread R -rtIs higher than normal. Whether this reaction to
—rtoccurs because the central bank views It as a good predictor of
future output growth or as a good indicator of recent policy laxity does not
4matter for current purposes.The final term (reflectsother components of
policy behavior. It would not impair ouranalysis tolet be
autocorr-elated, but itwould not help, either. Accordingly, we shall assume
thattiswhite noise.
Itmay be helpful to briefly consider the rationale for the
specification of policy behavior in (5). Regarding the rt_i term, there
exists some controversy regarding the reason behindcentralbanks' proclivity
forinterest rate smoothing——and, Indeed, for their useofinterest rate
instruments.But there Is virtually no disagreement with the proposition
that the Fed——and other majorcentral banks——have in fact employed such
practicesduringmost (Ifnot all) ofthe last 40years.0 (For some useful
discussion, see Goodfrlend (1991) and Poole (1991).)In addition (5)
reflectsthe assumption that the central banktendsto tighten policy when
the spread R—r is large. One possible rationalization is that the spread
isan indicator ofmonetary policy expansiveness, as suggested by Laurent
(1988), so that anunusuallyhigh value indicates the need for corrective
action.A different idea is that the spread provides an indicator of the
state of the economy from a cyclical perspective. Various Investigators,
including Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991) andMu(1993), have documented that
spread measures have predictive value for future real GNP growth rates.
Also, Hishkin (1990) has shownthata spread variable has some predictive
content for future inflation rates.Thus an attempt by the central bank to
conduct a forward-looking countercyclical policy would call for a response of
thetype Indicated in (5),i.e., a tightening when R —rtis high.11
Admittedly, In actual practice the Fed has used other predictor variables
instead of the spread.But to the extent that these and the spread are
useful predictors, the policy response would be much the same as implied by
(5).
SRelations (1) and (5) constitute only a portion, of course, of a
macroeconomic system.But if we assume that the disturbances and are
independent of those In the remaining relations, the system will be recursive
and the subsystem (l)(5) will determine rt and R without reference to the
other variables or shocks.Whether the remainder of the model does or does
not feature relations of the XS—LM type Is irrelevant, for example, as Is the
extent to which prices of goods are flexible.Let us consider, then, a
rational expectations solution to the system (j)(5)•12
Presuming that attention Is to be focused on the fundamental or
bubble—free solution yielded by the minimal—state—variable (MSV) criterion
discussed by McCalluxn (1983). we combine (1) and (5) to yield
(6) (1 + ) r, =art_t+ A [1/2 (rt + Etrt,1) + )+
and seek values of the undetermined coefficients #0, #i. #2. and that will
provide a rt solution of the form
(7) rt =#0+ Øirti+ +
Clearly, the latter implies that Er,1 — +•(+ #irt-, + + *t)
+ •2Psowe substitute these into (6) to obtain
(8) (1 + A)[#0 + #trt_i + #t + #tI =ort_t+ A [1/2(# + *,rt, +
+ #3t) + 1/2 (Ø+#(#+#irt_i+#2't+ •3t)+ #2Pt) + tl+
ThUS for (7) to be a solution ——tohold for all ,Ctrealizations ——it
must be true that:
(9) (1 + A) #0 =A00+ 1/2 A0t#0
(1 + A) #i + 1/2 A# + 1/2 A#12
(1 + A) 02 =1/2A2 + 1/2 X#1#2 + 1/2 Ap2+A
(1 ÷ A)= 1/2 A03 +1/2 + j
Thesecond of these is satisfied by two values of #i. namely,
(10) —(1+ A/2) [(1 + A/2)2 —2AoI"2
A
6but the MSV criterion implies that the one with the minus sign is relevant. 13
Then the remaining coefficients are straightforwardly given by the other
three equalities In (9).
In analyzing the implications of this solution it will be useful to
emphasize the important special case involving u• =1,which is the value
suggested by interest rate smoothing behavior. When c 1, the HSV solution
for becomes [(1 + J2) —(1—AJZ))/A=A/A 1 and the other three
equalities in (9) are simplified considerably. They yield #0,#2A/U





Furthermore, Er,1 -rt=*2Pt sowe find that the spread obeys
(12) R —rt=1/2(Ere+, —rt)+ =(1—pAJ2Y'E.




+ 1 ut +
so we can combine (12) and (13) to obtain
(14) 1/2(r —rti)= (Rt—rt_i)+
—pAJ2Ut+
Buthere u and are uncorrelated with R1 —rt_i,so (14) represents a
population version of the regression described in (3).Thus the slope
coefficient in (3) is a consistent estimator of pA/2, so the analyst should
anticipate a Slope well below 1.0. Indeed, if were white noise, with
p =0.a slope coefficient of zero would be implied ——eventhough relation
(1) is the main behavioral relation of the system. That result demonstrates,
I would suggest, not only that the usual regression test is inappropriate but
also that it Is misleading to think of the expectations theory in terms of
the "predictive content" of the spread for future changes of the short rate.
Such predictive content is not a necessary implication of that theory.
In addition, a zero slope coefficient would be implied if A =0,i.e.,
if the central bank did not respond to the current value of the spread but
7simply set rt equal to rt_i (plus, perhaps, ).Thisspecial case, of the
special case with o 1, represents the hypothesis of Mankiw and Miron
(1986)-—that the Federal Reserve has practiced interest rate smoothing and
thereby induced short rates to approximate a random walk process In their
behavior.Our result strongly supports the general idea of the Mankiw and
Miron hypothesis, but shows that it holds even if rt behavior is not that of
a random walk.
A few readers have remarked that (14) appears to be inconsistent with
the fact that a regression of form (3) should yield a slope coefficient of
1.0 in the special case in which the term premium is a constant. But with
=1.0in (5), a constant implies that R —rtIs also constant-—see
equation (12).Thus there is a degenerate regressor, in this case, so the
regression cannot be conducted. And in the case with 0 < 1.0, (14) does not
apply so again there is actually no inconsistency.
Let us now briefly consider the situation with u• < 1.In such cases we
would need to include a non—zero constant term in (5) to permit a stationary
equilibrium with E =0.The solution In this case yields a relationship
analogous to (14) that is less tidy than the latter, and Includes additional
predetermined variables.But it remains true that the probability limit of
the slope coefficient In a regression of rt —rt.ion R_, —rt_,is not in
general equal to 1.0 and is most likely to be smaller than 1.0; a
demonstration Is provided in Appendix A. Accordingly, the same general
message applies as in the more tractable case with o 1.That message is
that the realization of (say) a positive value of will drive up R
relative to rt via (1).But then R —rtwill be negatively correlated with
the composite disturbances + In (3), implyIng that least—
squares estimation of (4) will yield a slope coefficient that has a
probability limit not equal to 1.0.
8ilL N—Period Case
Now we turn to the more interesting case in which the long rate, R, is
for a bond with a maturity of more than two periods. In this case an
approximation to the expectations—hypothesis relationship between R and rt
canbewritten as
(15) R —NE(R,1 —= rt+
whereN+1 is a measure of the duration of the long rate.14In (5) the
left-hand side is an approximation to the one—period holding return on the
long—rate bond, the inexactness arising because the term R should pertain
to a maturity one period less than that for R. Thus for many-period
maturities, the approximation should be adequate. 15
In this case the apparent empirical failure to be explained arises from
writing (15) as
(16)N (R.1 —R)=(R—rt)— +
wherec.1 = — ER,1is an expectational error that with RE is
uncorrelated with R and rt.Thus if were constant, the Slope coefficient
in a regression of N(R,1 -R)on R —rtshould have a probability limit
of 1.0 according to the expectations theory. But such regressions again
actually yield slopes well below 1.0 with U.S. data. Indeed, the values
reported by Evans and Lewis ('1994) and Campbell and Shiller (1991) are
predominantly negative, as is documented in Table 2, and increase in absolute
value with N.
As in the last section we assume that the policy reaction equation (5)
obtains with A<1/N and that =Pet-i + Ut.6 Thenone can combine (5) and
(15) to obtain
(17) (1 + N) R =NER.1+ (1 + ÀY1(ort_i+ + + t.
The MSVsolutionwill be of the form
(18) R =1rrt,+2t +
9Table 2
















































10implying ER.1 ir1(1+AY(OTt_1 + A(wr_1+ + 3(t) + tl+
which canbesubstituted with (18) into (17) to give
(19) (1 + N) (flirt_i• + = Nw1(1+ A)_' For_1 + A(W1r_1 +
+ W3) + )+Nn2p+(1+AY'[ort_i + A(iirt_i + 1Ct+ W3t)+ t) + t.
For (18) to be a solution, then, we must have
(20) (1 + N) n, =NW1(i+ A)1 (a + Aw,) 4 (1 + AY' (o+
(l+N)fl2=N1ri(1+A)'2+NW2p+(j+A)'2+1
(1 + N) n =NW1(1+ A) (Aw3 + 1) + (1 + A)' (A + 1)
The first of these amounts to (1 + A) (1 + N)w, (Nir + 1) (+Aii) so we
have
((1 + A)(1 + N)—A—No](((1 +A)(1 + N)—A—No12 — (21)w, —
2NA
Theterm in square brackets will be positive, so the MSV solutionfor it, is
the expression in (21) with the minus sign.17 Given this value, the second
and third of equatIons (20) determIne it2 and x.
To facilitate analysis, let us again focus attention on the case with o
=1.Then we have [(1 +A)(1+ N) —(A+ N)12 (1 + A)2(1 + N)2 —2(1+ A)
(1 + N)(A +N)+ (A + N)2 =1+ 2NA + N2A2 and the term inside curly brackets
in (21) becomes 1 -2NA+ N2A2 (1 —NA)2.Consequently, we have itj =((1+
NA) -(1—NA)J/2NA=1,where the last calculation utilizes the assumed
condition 1 —NA> 0. Then with it, =1.the final equation in (20) implies it
=Iand it2 =(1+ A)/[1 + N -Np(1-A)1.Because 1
'NA,it2 is strictly
positive. Given these values, we readily see that
1+?. (22) R =rti+
1+N—Np(l+ A)
+
(23) rtrti ++ N + A)
+
Accordingly, the spread variable obeys
111 (24) R —rt=
1+ N —Np(1+ A)
and using (22) and (4) we also have
A+1 1 (25) R -
1+ N -Np(i +A) 1 + N —Np(1+ A)
+
(Ap + p — + (1 + X)u +
1 + N(1 —pCi+ A))
(1 + A) =CAp + p—1) (R_1 —rt.)+ 1+ N(1 —pCi+ A)) Ut+ t.
Consequently, we see that a regression of N(R —R_1)on —rttwill
have a slope coefficient whose probability limit is N(Ap+p—1) or
—N(l—p(1+A)). Clearly. the latter will be negative except for very large
values of p and/or A, and will be larger in absolute value (for a given p)
with longer maturities (larger N).18In qualitative terms, both of these
characteristics match the results of Evans and Lewis (1994) and Campbell and
Shiller (1991) reported in Table 2.
IV. Additional Evidence
The paper by Campbell and Shiller (1991) concludes with an attempt to
provide a summary characterization of term structure behavior that would be
consistent with their battery of empirical findings, which Include many more
than those reported here.In their words, The explanations we will consider
are not finance—theoretic models of time—varying risk premia, but simply
econometric descriptions of ways in which the expectations theory might fail"
(1991, p. 510). In terms of the notation of the present paper, the two
summary characterizations considered are (for the two—period case)
(26) —rt0.5 E(rt. —rt)+ c + Vt.
whereVt is added noise that is orthogonal to Er.i —rt,and
(27) —rt=k0.5E(r,t—rt)+ c
where k>1.The latter "could be described as an overreaction model of the
12yield spread,' according to Campbell and Shiller (1991, p. 513). They
explore the implications of these two summary characterizations of ways In
which the expectations theory might fail and conclude that (27) is consistent
with the data but that (26) Is not.
Let us consider how these characterizations compare with the explanation
of the present paper.Looking back at Section II, we see that equation (12)
is of a similar form to that of (26). but with the crucial difference that
in (12) is g orthogonal to Er,1 —rt.Thus the inadequacy of (26) does
not serve to discredit the model of Section Il. Furthermore, using the
expression —rt=#2Ptto eliminate from (12) results In
(28) R —r=(1/pA)Et(rt+i —rt)
for the model of Section II.But with O<A(2 and IpI<1, (28) Implies that k>1
in (27) if p is positive. So Campbell and Shiller's summary characterization
19 is consistent with the present paper s rationalization.
It was mentioned above that the slope coefficient reported in Table 1
for the years 1890 -1914was closer (than for more recent periods) to the
value of 1.0 that has been focused on in previous investigations.As Mankiw
and Miron (1986) emphasize, those years precede the founding of the Federal
Reserve System and therefore pertain to a period during which interest rate
smoothing behavior would be absent.In a similar vein, Kugler (1988, 1990)
finds that slope coefficients are closer to 1.0 for Germany and Switzerland
than for the United States during recent years. This result he attributes to
a smaller degree of interest smoothing behaviorbythe Bundesbank and the
Swiss National Bank. in comparison with the Fed, a hypothesized behavioral
difference that is consistent with the beliefs of many students of central
banking behavior. Since the model in Sections II and III presumes a
substantial degree of interest rate smoothing, this paper's explanation is
20 consistent with both of these findings.
13V. Concluding Remarks
The discussion of the foregoing paragraph suggeststhat onepossible way
of conducting additional tests of this paper's hypothesis would be to
consider different monetary policy regimes correspondingtodifferent time
periods for the United States and to different nations. Reaction functions
corresponding to (5) would be estimated and the implications of their
parameter values for the crucial slope coefficients then compared with values
of the coefficients obtained for these different regimes. Now, it may prove
possible to make some progress toward execution of such a study. There is,
however, a substantial difficulty that needsto bementioned. Specifically,
it is the case that actual central banks do not respond only to term spreads
in deciding upon changes in rt. Thus equation (5) represents a
simplification relative to actual behavior of the Fed, which almost certainly
responds to recent inflation and output or employment movements as well as
the spread.So, if one were to attempt to econometrically estimate actual
reaction functions, then measures of inflation and output gaps would need to
be included.But in that case values of these variables would need to be
explained endogenously, so the system of equations in the model would have to
be expanded. Furthermore, the dynamic behavior of inflation and output would
need to be modeled "correctly," which is an exceedingly difficult task given
the absence of professional agreement about short—run macroeconomic dynamics.
In short, this type of study would require specification and estimation of a
complete dynamic macroeconometric model.
In light of the foregoing discussion it will be seen that, because of
the simplified nature of our policy equation (5), this paper's proposed
explanation might be regarded as more of a parable than a fully—worked—out
quantitative model.I would argue, however, that this is not a source of
embarrassment, for most knowledge in economics is actually of the parable
14type.21Therelevant issue is whether a proposed parable Is fruitful in
understanding Important economic phenomena. In this particular case the
proposed parable suggests that slope estimates in regressions of the form (3)
or (16) differ from 1.0 despite the validity of a versidn of the expectations
theory of the term structure. This version permits the holding—period yields
on securities of various maturities to differ by a random discrepancy that is
exogenous but perhaps serially correlated. The basic idea of the parable is
that the estimated slope coefficient is a composite parameter reflecting
policy behavior as well as the behavior of market participants, with the type
ofpolicy postulated involving interest rate smoothing and response to the
long—short spread, the latter reflecting important aspects of the state of
the economy.The fact that essentially the same parable canrationalizea
major anomaly in foreign exchange markets must be regarded as a significant
mark In its favor.
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19Footnotes
1The hypothesized form of policy behavior involvessmoothing of (relative)
Interest rates. witl these rates used as Instruments, together with policy
attempts to 'lean against" exchange rate changes. The analysis also assumes
random disturbances——from varying risk premia——to the UIP relationship.No
departure from rational expectations Is involved.
2General aspects of the failure are discussedby Cook and Hahn (1990).
Campbell and Shiller (1991), and Evans and Lewis (1994), among others.
3SInce drafting thispaper I have become aware of a study with a rather
similar objective by Rudebusch (1994). which is also intended to provide a
generalization of the Mankiw-Miron hypothesis.The type of policy behavior
assumed there is quite different, however, as instrument settings are
responsive to current conditions In my setup but are determined exogenously
in his. Most significantly, Rudebusch's analysis does not offer an
explanation for the empirical phenomena rationalized below at the end of
Section III and in Section IV.
4The relationship is exact, if the interest ratesare based OflContinuous
compounding, or an approximation otherwise: see Shiller (1990).
analogous result holds for the case of three—month and one—month rates;
see Kugler (1988, 1990).
6The Roberds, Runkie, and Whiteman (1993) resultsare for treasury bills.
This study also reports results using Federal Funds and Repo securities and
finds one slope coefficient close to 1.0 for the former using the sample
period 1979. 10 —1982.10.
7This possibility has beenexplored, using survey data on expectations, by
Froot (1989).
208For values of c less than 1.0, a constant term should also be included in
(5) if E =0.4e have not shownithere, however, because the case with o
=1will be featured below and because little interest attaches to the
constant term in any case.
91n what follows, A<2 will be presumedbecausesuch a condition seems
plausible and also because a theoretical issue, concerning the root of (10)
that gives the bubble-free solution, arises when A>2. (On this issue see
Appendix B. )But the solutions obtained below, and most of the analysis,
would continue to prevail with Aa2.
10Some analysts are dubious that the Fed's control over the one—day Federal
Funds rate translates into effective control over one—month or three—month
treasury bill rates that are the operational counterpart of rt in (5).But
the evidence of Cook and Hahn (1989) suggests that three—month rates do, In
fact, respond within the day to policy—induced changes in the Federal Funds
rate.Furthermore, if the Fed doubted its ability to control treasury bill
rates it could (given its holdings) operate directly in the treasury bill
markets. Consequently, doubts concerning the controllability of rt seem to
be unfounded.
21111n an influential recent publication, Goodfriend (1993) suggests that the
Fed regards (or should regard?) the long rate as an indicator of "inflation
scares,' behavior that sight be Interpreted as descriptive of a rule of the
form rt =&rti+6(R-+ t. Thelatter can be written in the form (5)
by defining u =61(1—B)and A 01(1—0). but then dynamic stability
(non—explosiveness) requires 6<1—0 (assuming that 0<0<1). It is not clear
that Goodfriend would agree with the above formulation, however: another
possibility is rt rt.., +O(R-R.1)+. Inany event, the policy
behavior pattern In his article has a substantial degree of similarity with
formulation (5): both call for an increase In the short rate In response to a
ceteris paribus rise in the long rate.
12Students of the price level determinacy literature——e.g., McCallum (1981)
(1986), Dotsey and King (1983), Canzoneri, Henderson, and Rogoff (1985)--wlll
wonder about the absence of nominal variables in the system (1)(5).But the
price level can be brought in by adding (e.g. ) an IS—type relation in which a
real rate such as rt —(Ep,1—Pt)appears. Ptbeingthe log of the price
level.Then determinacy of Pt will require the presence of an additional
term in (5), one that includes a nominal variable such as Pt or Ep+1 or
Pt-i.Algebraic analysis becomes much more difficult because the counterpart
of (10) below will be a cubic in many such cases. But a cubic must have at
least one real root, so in principle determinacy can be investigated.My
examination of a case with Pt included in (5) indicates that determinacy
would be guaranteed unless o =1.0exactly.Thus for a close to 1.0, the
results would be approximately the same as those emphasized below.
'3mlsisthe root that yields 4, =0when o= 0,a special case in which It
is clear that rt1 would be an extraneous state variable [as discussed in
McCallum (1983)].
2214For pure discount bonds, N+1 Is the maturity.
15Equation (15) can alternatively be written as R (1—6)E' Etrt,1, +term
premium, with the summation from 0 to .Thusthe approximation amounts to
an infinite—maturity version of the linearization developed by Shiller
(1979), with N .5/(1—).This approximation has also been used by Shiller,
Campbell, and Schoenholtz (1983), Campbell and SMiler (1991), Fuhrer and
Moore (1993), and Hardouvells (1994).
16The condition A <1/Nis the counterpart of A <2in the two period case (in
which N1) and is again presumed but not strictly required.The larger is
N. the smaller will be A in equation (5) because only one A can prevail, but
many long rates can be considered.
17Again this is because with o' =0,rt_i should not appear in the solution for
18The policy parameter A would be expected to be smaller for larger N.This
effect reinforces the tendency for the slope coefficient to increase in
absolute value with N.
19The foregoing discussion implies, incidentally, that there is actually
nothing bizarre or irrational about a finding expressible as k>1 in (27).
20For additional discussion of the Mankiw—Miron hypothesis, see Cook and Hahn
(1990).
21Consider the usual depiction of a production function as y =f(n,kt),
where the symbols should not reqi1re definition. Can this depiction be
considered anything more than a parable?
23Appendix A
Here the concern is with the modelofSection II when o<1.0.From (9),
we find that




where 6 =1—(.p—l)?.J2.Then from (A—i) it follows that
(A-2) Er,i -rt=+ (i — i)r+Ap/(5—pA/2)
and thus using (12) that
(A—3) —rt=(i/2)[+(—1)rt+(pJ(6—p/2))J+
Now,equation (2) indicates that the plim of the slope coefficient on R -rt
in the regression (3) will equal 1.0 minus plim T'(R —rt)/plimT1(R -
rt)2.Its value will be smaller than 1.0, then, If E(R—rt)is positive.
From (A—3) it is clear that there are two components to E(R —rt).








Here (1 -1)A/2is positive, since ,<1 when o<i (see below), andpX!2tl.
Thus expression (A-5) is unambiguously positive. The second component is
(A—6) (i/2)( —1)Ert,
in which the term • —Iis negative but will be small for o (and ,) close
to 1.0. To sign we use (A-i) and (4) as follows, assuming 0:
(A—7) Ert E[0 +irt_,+#2t +





Thelatter is unambiguously positive since #2>0 and I#tpI<l. Thus the second
component is negative but will tend to be small relative to the first.
24It remains to demonstrate that •<1 when c<1. But we have found that
(A—9)
(j +A/2)— + A/2)2—
WithO<o<i, we have 2A>2Xo>O so the terE in square brackets is positive and
2
larger than (1 -A/2) Thus the value of •i is smaller than when this term
equals (I —A12)2,i.e., when o —1.But #i remains non—negative because the
term in brackets Is smaller than (1 + A/2)2.
25Appendix B
Here the purpose to explain the difficulty concerning the roots of (10),
mentioned In footnote 9, that would obtain with A ) 2.To see the Issue,
consider the case In which c•1, so that the •solutionsare [(1 + A/2)
(U—A/2)2)"2)/A.Denote these solutions as and and define
as ((1 +A/2)-((1—A/2)2)'"'2J/Afor A ( 2.But then If A > 2, is
the "same"root equalto [(1+A12)—U—A/2)1—1or to [(1 + A/2)+
(1—A./2)I/A=2/A?Note that the latter is suggestedbythe convention that
(22)1/2 is a positive numberregardlessof the sign of Z.Butdefiningthe
relevant root as =Ifor all A >0 seems more appropriate than making
equal to 1 or 2/A depending on whether A < 2 or A ) 2.Then equations
(11) —(14)are valid even with A > 2. (Similar considerations apply to
equatIons(21)—(25)if we permit NA > 1.)
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